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The necessity of false values. —
One can refute a judgment by
proving its conditionally : the need
to retain it is not thereby removed.
False values cannot be eradicated
by reasons any more than astigma-
tism in the eyes of an irivalid. One
must grasp the need for their exist-
ence : they are a consequence of
causes which have nothing to do
with reasons.
NIETZSCHE(The Will to Power)
INTRODUCTION
Normative integration is a social process in which social
norms get accepted, that is, integrated. Since the process as a
whole depends on the nature of the norm itself it might be useful
to describe the nature of the social norm before embarking on
the discussion about normative integration. The norm, as the
name already suggests, will be most often defined according to
its deontological function and thereby reduced to its moral con-
notation. In theology, for example, this is possible because the
normative function derives its justincation from a transcendental
entity and therefore there is no need to explain the social origin
of the norm. It is only recently that the other aspect of social
norms has been described : insofar as the norm actually lives in
society through the individual behavior, it is not only prescriptive,
but also descriptive. In linguistics, it has been said, the grammar
does not only say how the people ought to use the language, but
actually describes what is happening when the people speak and
write. The same holds true for the games where the norm actual-
ly is a constitutive element of the game in the sense that there
would be no game should the players not obey the rules from
the very beginning. Paradoxical as it may seem, this is also true
for society and therefore also for religion as the first explicit
formulation of the social norms. However, in the area of law the
norm was traditionally regarded as a prescription of how the
people ought to behave. Throughout history the norms of the law
derived their justification from a moral ideal, most often from
a religious one (the doctrine of natural law is the latest example).
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This had, as a consequence, an exclusively deontological concept
of the legal norm.
Consequently, legal reasoning was essentially independent
from pragmatic policy considerations, although these actually in-
fluenced the creation of norms through the underlying morality,
which, on the other hand, was the result of social needs. Without
direct interference of policy considerations, the legal reasoning
was seemingly independent from them. Since the legal norms and
their interpretations lived in a relatively closed and self-sufficient
system, legal reasoning and the whole legal system were autono-
mous. The norm was understood as independent of reality, more-
over reality was supposed to live up to the norm. Whereas in
science the laws are formulated to express and explain reality, in
law the reality was understood as something that has to be the
function of the law. The dominant morality, although formed
according to the needs of those who proclaimed and enforced it,
was more or less indiscriminately accepted. In other words, the
law corresponded to the needs of society at the particular stage
of development and the function of the law was understood as
purely prescriptive. This principle has been based on the firm
foundation of morality.
However, at a certain stage of development it becomes clear
that the law is but la cristallisation du passé pour étrangler
l'avenir. But it was not only the anarchists (Kropotkin) who came
to that conclusion. Russell wrote : « In the modern world, the
principle of growth in most men and women is hampered by
institutions from a simpler age » (see Chomsky, 1971). When it
becomes clear that the law is only a means toward a certain end,
then it also becomes clear that there is a possibility of a frequent
disjunction between means and ends and the notion of law is
therefore understood instrumentally. On the other hand, it also
becomes clear, that the norm expresses the reality, that it is not
only prescriptive, but also descriptive (see Wittgenstein, 1966).
The law, because of its occasional inadequacy for attain-
ment of implicit ends, transcends its positivistic definition. The
norm ceases to be sacrosanct and is manipulated by the teleolo-
gical interpretation to an unprecedented extent. Its inflexibility
becomes occasionally a serious obstacle to the attainment of under-
lying policies. Consequently, the logical analysis has to be extended
beyond the norm, i.e., it is applied according to the interest the
CRIMINAL LAW AND NORMATIVE INTEGRATION 57
norm is supposed to sustain. The legal reasoning becomes pur-
posive (Dworkin, 1969).
Consequently, the norm can be defined as a delimitation of
interests. The interests in the last analysis depend on power. This
view, devoid as it is of any moralistic approach, points to an
anomic situation because the morality, which used to serve as a
powerful rationalization, is no longer internalized. This morality
was strong after the bourgeois revolution when the aspirations of
the new social order were clear and accepted. It corresponded to
the needs of the society as a whole, although it served primarily
the interests of the leading social class. This morality became the
dominant social consciousness and expressed itself through social
practice, thereby reinforcing its own basis, the collective senti-
ments.
This morality was expressed in the law. The law was enforced
through established institutions. It permeated the social conscious-
ness, because it was disposed to accept it as inevitable. In other
words, there was a dialectical relationship between the law and
social consciousness. This relationship can only be defined dyna-
mically as one of mutual positive reinforcement. It meant the
acceptance of law and its underlying morality, a process which
we will term normative integration \
1. If normative integration is meant as integration of norms as de-
fined by law, then it is in positive correlation with the normative homo-
geneity of society. The normative homogeneity of society can be seen
vertically, that is, how many norms are shared in all the classes, but it
can also be seen horizontally, that is, how many norms are accepted in
the same class. Here, the values that developed historically will very often
remain, even after they no longer serve a purpose and even inhibit social
development. In this respect American society is very different from the
European one. In Europe, the old morality of aspiration and duty did not
completely disappear after revolution. The old aristocratic values remained
alive, transformed themselves into bourgeois values and mingled with them.
Class inhibitions, for example, are more evident in Europe than they are
in the United States, although the classes are structured in almost the
same manner. The new bourgeois morality, because of its only partial
acceptance, allowed for the development of new ideologies that questioned
the capitalist one. From this, two consequences at least followed : first,
the integration of the capitalist normative structure was not as intense as
in America, which was virtually born into capitalism. Capitalism, with
all its good and bad consequences, could never be as intense as in America :
there were too many conflicting values which inhibited the entrepreneurial
activity and allowed only for a limited development in this direction (see
Duverger, 1967). Second, because of the less intense internalization of the
dominant ideology, there was enough place for development of alternative
ideologies as Communism, Socialism, etc. These in turn enfeebled the
process of internalization of the dominant ideology. This made the European
social conscience more « eclectic » and skeptical.
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Anomie is the counterpart of normative integration and its
apparent negation. It cannot be defined as an absence of norms,
because there still exists the enforced normative system. But this
system is not internalized any more because of the disjunction
between the social and cultural structure (Merton, 1971). How-
ever, anomie is normlessness only from the standpoint of the
officially enforced normative system. Apart from that, it is an
expression of a definable set of norms which is opposed to the
norms of social structure. Anomie is therefore only a particular
kind of morality2. The criminal population, for example, has
very well defined aspirations and criteria of good and bad. The
fact that this morality is contrary to the legal system does not
mean that the criminal population does not have any norms at
all. Their morality is in fact the only logical response to the social
conditions in which they live. If they behave according to the
dominant social consciousness, they often renounce their own
interests.
This morality, incongruent as it is with the socially pro-
claimed one, is perceived from the standpoint of the existing social
order only as a negation and not as an attempt of constructing
a new positive normative structure. Anomie is diffuse, negative
in its manifestation and there are no social institutions that would
express it. It is not structured in itself. As such it is not selective
and attacks the existing normative structure as a whole (Erikson,
1968, p. 173). It is indiscriminate as to which social values have
to be preserved because they, in fact, are socially useful. Never-
theless, it is an anticipation of the new morality and its function
is to diminish the influence of the old one.
Merton (1971, p. 460-465) describes three responses to
anomie : ritualization, retreatism and rebellion. All of them are
indiscriminate and except for rebellion they do not have any
genuinely constructive background. Because of this, it seems to be
necessary to sustain the existing normative structure by fostering
normative integration until the old can be replaced by a more
suitable new normative structure.
2. Erikson (1968, p. 174-175) describes the concept of negative iden-
tity, which as an individual phenomenon is but an analogue to anomie as
a social process. Nevertheless, the rejection of identification with the
existing social institutions logically implies an underlying set of unex-
pressed and not articulated values which are in conflict with those offered
by the society.
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From what was said above it would follow that the stronger
the previous normative integration, the stronger the following
anomic reaction. This is so because the intense normative integra-
tion petrifies the social contradictions inherent in the existing
social order. The collective sentiments become conditioned to
certain responses and the ideology is internalized to a greater
extent3. When this response, which is also manifested in the law,
becomes inadequate, it amplifies the dimension of its own incon-
gruity with actuality. In the society and in the individual there is
little place for the new social and individual consciousness and
identity to develop in a positive way. The strength of the old
inadequate consciousness prevents the positive reaction to arise
and consequently the individual and the society inevitably react
negatively to the extent the previous internalization of values
conflicts with the existing social conditions. Therefore, the more
constructive the previous normative integration, the more de-
structive its anomic reaction. The more homogeneous the society
is in the phase of normative integration, the more heterogeneous
in the time of anomie.
But even though we accept the inevitableness of this trend
of development, we are still concerned with the defense of certain
norms against the threat of their anomic negation. But since it is
impossible to select some norms which ought to be defended and
exclude others, we have to defend the system as a whole. The
legal system is a highly articulated system of interdependent rules
and it expresses the normative structure of a certain social order.
It is not possible to change only certain values and rules with-
out changing the system as a whole. Exactly because we deal
with a system and this system also represents certain interests,
the evolutionary change is limited in the possibility of its extent.
Once the law has exhausted the bounds of possibilities for change
in the framework of a given social structure, it has to be enforced
as a whole, not only partially. Further concessions are politically
unacceptable, although the rigid enforcement may speed up the
anomic processes.
Punishment as a moral reaction, that is, as the morally
understood criminal responsibility, has a positive effect on the
3. Chomsky (1973) has elaborated on the processes that make intel-
lectuals internalize and legitimatize ideology although they could be aware
of its inadequacy.
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sustainment of normative integration and therefore a negative,
a diminishing effect on the anomic processes.
However natural the anomic response may be, it is indis-
criminately destructive towards all the norms. Therefore, it is
desirable to keep it under control. This cannot be achieved merely
by morally neutral response to the violation of norms. However
difficult it may be to find or construe the moral base to punish-
ment, this is the postulate of the administration of criminal
justice 4.
It is only natural that the lack of identification with the
moral standards started to permeate the social institutions which
are the very embodiment of the morality underlying the criminal
law. This is symptomatic and logical. However, in the present
moment there is also a need for preserving the moral nature of
the norms, at least those that prohibit the unquestionable mala
in se.
If the criminal law is not totally devoid of influence upon
the normative integration, and we believe it is not, this attitude
of moral neutrality, which seems to pervade the modern theory
of criminal law, is wrong because it fails to establish any positive
differentiation between various degrees of social adequacy of the
norms. It generalizes the negative attitude towards the moral
connotation of the norm, just as the criminal anomic response
does this on the other side of the line of power.
The doctrine of the morally neutral role of the criminal law,
fortunately, is still mainly of academic nature (and importance).
The majority of the systems of criminal law and administration
of criminal justice still, and inevitably so, function on the premise
of moral responsibility. The derision of this moral attitude on the
part of theory, we believe, is out of place.
This kind of theory, here we refer mainly to the traditional
Scuola positiva with Ferri and its modification by Gramatica and
Marc Ancel into la Défense sociale nouvelle, deals with utilitarian
arguments, supposedly of humanitarian nature. It proposes to re-
place the syllogism crime-responsibility-punishment by another
4. Szasz, 1963, p. 97 : « Bazelon offered another reason for not
wishing to punish offenders. He dislikes blaming people, and does not wish
to pass moral judgments on their conduct. As I understand the judge'sjob, however, this is precisely what he is expected to do. » (Emphasis
added) (Szasz refers to Judge Bazelon's Isaac Ray Award Lectures : Baze-
lon, Equal Justice for the Unequal, 1961).
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syllogism crime-establishment of dangerousness-treatment. Besides
the arguments concerning fundamental human rights, which
would obviously be endangered by this kind of development, this
theory and its variations can be defeated on its own premises.
This doctrine looks upon morality as something that is eo ipso
irrational and does not serve any practical purpose. It juxtaposes
its pragmatic arguments to this « irrationality ». Consequently,
if it is possible for us to show that morality in the criminal law
serves very practical purposes of normative integration, it would
be proven that the doctrine is wrong.
It must be clear here, that the nature of argumentation in
this paper is not different from the one described above. My argu-
mentation is pragmatical and purposive too. It refers to questions
outside the criminal law. We are not juxtaposing two different
kinds of thinking, the a prioristic with the purposive, we are only
confronting two levels of purposive legal reasoning.
We will examine punishment, the psychological aspect and
the sociological aspect of normative integration. Criminal law is
enforced upon the presumption of punishment as an effective
means of control of human behavior. Therefore, the nature of
punishment and its influence upon the human behavior has to be
examined first in order to prove that punishment has the effects it
is presumed to have. Normative integration, on the other hand,
is both an individual and a social process. Punishment is always
inflicted upon the individual, it cannot be otherwise, therefore it
is important to see how it does influence the acceptance of social
values in those punished but also in those who only know that
somebody was punished for certain behavior. Here the process
becomes social and becomes different from the one going on in
the individual consciousness. Punishment is much more important
in relation to those who obey the law than in relation to those
who violate it. This has been an accepted hypothesis.
But, as we will see, punishment is no longer easy to define.
In the times of corporal punishment there was no pretense about
the influence of punishment upon the offender's personality. Today,
the aspirations behind punishment are different and therefore
punishment itself has changed considerably 5. Very often, however,
5. Compare, Friedrich Nietzsche, 1965, sec. 201, p. 114 : «There is
a point in the history of society when it becomes so pathologically soft
and tender that among other things it sides even with those who harm it,
the criminals, and does this quite seriously and honestly. Punishing some-
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it was only the label that has been changed and one has to take
care to distinguish the change in denotations from the change in
the actual treatment of offenders. With the actual change in the
nature of punishment, however, there also emerges a need for the
change in the role of the criminal law. Corporal punishment was
a much lesser invasion of privacy than the attempt to change the
offender's personality. Therefore, a fortiori, the safeguards of the
criminal law have to be preserved.
In every society punishment is associated with moral stig-
matization and while this stigmatization is in itself a part of
punishment it is also an expression of the law-abiding citizen's
individual reaction to punishment. It indicates the successful in-
ternalization of moral norms. Psychology has developed concepts
that explain how, in human personality, certain agencies inhibit
the morally unacceptable behavior. It would be the aim of enforce-
ment of the criminal law to sustain these agencies in their
inhibiting functions.
When people communicate with one another there develops
a social conscience which is more than a simple sum of individual
consciences. It is less flexible and relatively independent. It con-
tains the same moral inhibitions and since it is more difficult to
change, it is important for the criminal law to rely on it and to
sustain its moral functions.
We, therefore, have three questions. First, one has to define
punishment and since punishment is always a concrete action in
relation to the individual, punishment can only be defined in this
connection. Secondly, punishment has its immediate influence on
the individual who is being punished, but it also has an influence
upon other individuals and supports their moral convictions.
Thirdly, punishment influences the social consciousness and it is
therefore necessary to examine how and under what conditions
this occurs.
Accordingly, this paper is divided in three sections : I. Theory
of Punishment, II. The Psychological Aspect of Normative Inte-
how seems unfair to it, and it is certain that imagining « punishing » and
« being supposed to punish » hurts it, arouses fear in it. « Is it not enough
to render him undangerous ? Why still punish ? Punishing itself is terrible. »
With this question, herd morality, the morality of timidity, draws its ulti-
mate consequence. Supposing that one could altogether abolish danger, the
reason for fear, this morality would be abolished, too, eo ipso : it would
no longer be needed, it would no longer consider itself necessary. »
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gration and III. The Sociological Aspect of Normative Integra-
tion.
We will trace the outline of the following propositions :
1. Social order generates anomie, if social structure and the
dominant social conscience do not correspond to the stage of
development of society.
2. Anomie affects the society as a whole, but the intensity of
anomie processes varies according to the discrepancy between
the interests of the particular interest stratum of society and
interests represented in criminal law.
3. Anomie processes indicate the necessity for change in the
normative structure of society. They fail, however, to differentiate
between the norms which are socially useful and those which are
not.
4. The dominant normative structure of society is a highly arti-
culated system. As such it can change only as a whole and can-
not change partially. The choice has to be made whether to defend
it as a whole or not to defend it at all.
5. The normative structure, therefore, has to be defended as
a whole, especially because the anomie processes attack it as a
whole.
6. Criminal law influences collective sentiments through punish-
ment. Punishment reinforces collective sentiments inasmuch as
they have a sufficient level of intensity. If the level of intensity is
not high enough, punishment will only reduce the visibility of
anomie or even catalyze the anomie processes.
7. The influence of punishment is, therefore, relevant primarily
in relation to the law-abiding population, because it is there that
the collective sentiments are sufficiently intense.
8. The lack of identification with the predominant normative
system has affected social theory and the agencies which enforce
criminal law. This tendency, together with the concentration of
attention upon individual offenders has produced or tends to
produce a morally neutral application of criminal law.
9. If we want punishment to have a positive influence upon
normative integration, if we want punishment to sustain or enhance
collective sentiments, the moral connotation of punishment must
be preserved.
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10. However, punishment is not a solution to the problem of
anomie. In the system of formal justice it can channel it into
different areas of social life or force it to take a different form.
In the situation of the progressively advancing need for change
of the social and value structure, its aim must be to defend the
basic social values which express the needs of the society as a
whole. It can defend them, however, only by defending the norma-
tive system as a whole, because anomie cannot be allowed to
develop in some areas without affecting the vital centers of the
normative structure.
11. Consequently, the enforcement of criminal law will neces-
sarily have an ambivalent effect : it will intensify normative inte-
gration for some norms in some strata of society, and at the same
time it will enhance anomie for other norms in other strata of
society.
A. THEORY OF PUNISHMENT
Every legal norm must have a sanction. Without sanction,
the norm is a mere recommendation, it is lex imperfecta. Criminal
law differs from other branches of law, not by the fact that it
punishes, but by the nature of its punishment. Those areas of
social life that are believed to be very important are protected
against acts which would harm them, by the kind of punishment
which affects not only personal property but also personal liberty.
While the aim in other disciplines of law is to influence behavior,
the aim of criminal law is more absolute. Its postulate is to
eliminate certain kinds of behavior.
Criminal law defines the conditions for criminal responsibi-
lity. Criminal responsibility is the bridge between the criminal
act and its punishment. It contains all the positive and negative
conditions which have to be present in order to warrant punish-
ment (conditions such as mens rea, sanity, causal nexus between
the deed and the consequence, the correspondence of the act to
the abstract definition of the criminal law, etc.). Because of its
legal importance the question of criminal responsibility often be-
comes the center of inquiry. It invites ethical argumentation and
is often a barrier to a realistic discussion of the nature of the
criminal law.
Socially the essence of the criminal law is not criminal re-
sponsibility, but punishment. Punishment and its influence upon
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the individual and the society is the central question. If punish-
ment proves to be an effective instrument of social control, then
criminal law has its raison d'être ; if not, then it is just an atavistic
aggressive response, the attitude of hostility. Therefore, the nature
of punishment and of its effects is the preliminary question in
defining the role of criminal law.
What is punishment ? As it is usually understood, and crimi-
nal legal theory does not go beyond this, it is functionally defined
suffering. The function is twofold : first, it is a retribution for the
behavior that frustrated the one who inflicts punishment and,
second, it is expected to alter this undesirable behavior in the
future. From the standpoint of the one who is punished, punish-
ment is frustration causally linked to the past behavior.
The only scientific definition available today is the behaviorist
definition of punishment.
1. THE BEHAVIORIST DEFINITION OF PUNISHMENT
In the behaviorist doctrine (see Skinner, 1953) punishment
is a phenomenon that influences the process of learning and the
process of behavior modification. Every human behavior which
is followed by suffering is negatively reinforced. Punishment, be
it a natural consequence of behavior or consciously inflicted, is
withdrawing the positive reinforcer of the respective behavior
and/or presenting the negative reinforcer.
« A positive reinforcer is any stimulus the presentation of
which strengthens the behavior upon which it is made contingent.
A negative reinforcer (an aversive stimulus) is any stimulus the
withdrawal of which strengthens the behavior. »
The effect of punishment is not, as it is usually presumed,
the opposite of award. While positive reinforcement actually
changes not only behavior but the personality behind, negative
reinforcement works only as a counterbalance to positive rein-
forcement that has already resulted in a certain pattern of be-
havior. Consequently, one may say that while a positive reinforce-
ment of behavior may stand alone and therefore really guide the
behavior, the negative reinforcement is always posterior to positive
reinforcement and there is always a conflict between them. If
there were no positive reinforcement of the undesirable behavior,
there would be no undesirable behavior, so that the actual con-
trast exists between positive reinforcement of certain behavior
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and the absence of any stimulus, and not between the positive
and negative reinforcement.
The effect of punishment is not the opposite of the effect
of award, although the behavior would occasionally suggest that.
While a positive reinforcement may change the behavior perma-
nently, the negative reinforcement will be efficacious only if in
its strength and duration it counterbalances the positive reinforcers
of the respective behavior. A habitual property offender, for
example, would have to be constantly and consistently punished
and his behavior controlled in order to neutralize his behavior
pattern. A murderer, on the other hand, if the murder was com-
mitted because of family tension, would not have to be punished
at all, if we assume that the positive reinforcement of his behavior
was eliminated with the death of the murdered person.
If we have the combination of consistent positive reinforce-
ment of undesirable behavior and occasional, inconsistent punish-
ment, the latter will be ineffective : the undesirable behavior
responses tend to reemerge and, as it was proven in animal experi-
ments, in the long run the total number of undesirable behavior
responses tend to be the same, with or without punishment.
On the other hand, behavior which has consistently been
punished becomes the source of conditioned stimuli which evoke
incompatible behavior. It establishes aversive conditions which are
avoided by any behavior of « doing something else » (Skinner,
1953). No change in the strength of the punished response is
implied. The change of the undesirable behavior can only be
accomplished by positive reinforcement of different behavior.
Apart from the question of its efficacy, punishment has
several undesirable byproducts. Obviously, the most important
one is the conflict between the urge towards the original re-
sponse, that was merely suppressed and the fear and anxiety
evoked by negative reinforcement.
If, unorthodox as this may be, we shift here the perspective
and use a psychoanalytical explanation, we are obviously denning
the neurotic condition. Punishment is frustration and if it can-
not be overcome by defense mechanisms, the neurotic condition
of inner conflict emerges and develops either into a chronic con-
dition of fear, anxiety and psychosomatic troubles and/or be-
havioral escapes.
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If punishment is to have any effect on the behavior, it has
to be consistent6. Every undesirable response has to be punished
immediately. Without this consistency, of course, the disappear-
ance of the undesirable behavior has to be attributed to the
absence of its positively reinforcing stimuli and not to punish-
ment. If the social institutions that inflict punishment according
to criminal law cannot react as consistently as required, the effect
of punishment upon the people with strongly reinforced undesirable
behavior, will not be successful7. In fact, this means that unless
every crime is uncovered and the offender punished, one should not
expect the punishment to have a lasting effect upon the offender.
This points to the importance of the police and its techniques of
uncovering criminal activity.
2. PUNISHMENT AND AGGRESSION
There is another aspect of punishment in connection with
aggression. Both Durkheim (1893) and Mead (1934) (infra) recog-
nized that « punishment consists of a passionate reaction >.
Aggression is an instinctual response inherited from our
philogenetical past. The arousal of this emotion served the bio-
logical purpose of preparing an animal to take action, whether
this might be in response to fear, or fighting in response to rage.
It is accompanied by bodily changes, but this mechanism is still
incompletely understood. The feeling of anger originates from the
hypothalamus (part of the lower brain), the function of which is
to coordinate emotional responses, including anger (see Storr,
1968).
Aggression is an instinctive response, programmed and in-
hibited in an instinctive way. Lorenz (1963) has shown that there
is an inhibition of intra-species aggressiveness in direct proportion
to the dangerousness of the aggression equipment at the disposal
of the particular species. Carnivora like wolves and lions must
be inhibited against attacking other members of their species,
6. This idea was expressed as early as Montesquieu's l'Esprit des
lois, Book VI, Ch. 1. He emphasizes that it is the inevitability of punish-
ment which can diminish « human corruption » and not its harshness.
7. « Usually the group is not well organized, nor are the practices
of reinforcement and punishment consistently sustained. Within the group,
however, certain controlling agencies manipulate particular sets of variables.
These agencies are usually better organized than the group as a whole,
and they often operate with greater success... Controlling agencies are
concerned specifically with certain kinds of power over variables which
affect human behavior and with the controlling practices which can be
employed because of that power. » (Skinner, 1953, p. 333-334).
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otherwise the survival of the species would be endangered ; and
because their aggression equipment is very powerful, the inhibi-
tions must be stronger too because of the greater danger.
In comparison with other carnivora, the human species is
ill-equipped for aggression. Consequently, there is not enough
instinctual inhibition of intra-species aggression. The development
of this inhibition could follow the species mutation in respect to
its aggression equipment, but could not follow the behavioral
adaptation of the human species, i.e., the development of the
tools of aggression. Therefore, the human species is in constant
danger from itself.
However, as we will see later, in discussion of the pycho-
logical aspect of normative integration, there have developed
certain inhibitions of social and psychological nature, which, even
though not instinctual, nevertheless perform the required inhibitive
function. This, for Lorenz too, is the only answer to the question
of irrational aggressiveness, namely the development of « moral
responsibility ».
With the development of society these inhibitions have
evolved sua sponte, as an automatic response to the social needs,
just as the biological inhibitions evolve automatically according
to the needs of the preservation of the species.
In the animal world aggression plays the role of selection
and preservation. In human society it manifests itself through
vengeance and punishment and thereby also serves the need of
preservation of society and individual. Through this development
punishment becomes less and less « passionate reaction » and
becomes more and more a rational response to undesirable be-
havior. At a certain stage it passes from the hands of individual
vengeance to the societal agencies more free from the instinctual
response and therefore in a better position to use punishment
rationally.
According to Weber (1967) this is the transition from sub-
stantially irrational to substantively rational lawmaking and law-
finding. In the case of substantively irrational lawmaking and
lawfinding, the decision is influenced by concrete factors of the
particular case as evaluated upon an ethical, emotional, or poli-
tical basis, rather than by general norms. In the case of substan-
tively rational lawmaking and lawfinding the decision is influenced
by norms derived from logical generalizations and abstract interpre-
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tations of meaning of ethical imperatives, utilitarian rules, expedi-
ental rules, and political maxims. Obviously, we are speaking here
about a continuous change, and the goal of substantive rationality
is not achieved merely by the agent of punishment. The same
trend manifests itself once the function of punishment is passed
into the hands of the State.
When it becomes clear that punishment does not, in fact,
change the energy behind the undesirable behavior, the attention
is focused on its influence upon the society as a whole. One assumes
that it is not by chance that punishment still exists, in spite of the
fact that its inefficiency in modifying the behavior of criminals is
proven. This influence of sustaining collective sentiments (Dur-
kheim) behind the repressive law or in Mead's words « the inte-
grative function of the hostile attitude » is then finally taken into
consideration (see Andenaes, 1971).
The more aggression there is behind the punishment, and
it may well be expressed in « righteous moral indignation », the
greater the possibility that it will be irrationally inflicted, rationality
being defined in terms of the goal of changing the individual
offender. This irrationality may, however, be quite important in re-
lation to the necessary sustenance of the existing moral standards.
While we become more and more aware of the rational aims
of punishment, we try to transform it so as to serve the purpose of
reformation of the individual. But since we are still unable to
give up the aggressive and moralistic connotation of our reaction
to violations of social norms, there arises the possibility of con-
flict between the two goals. On the one hand, the goal of retribu-
tion which society still is not able to part with and, on the other
hand, the goal of the reformation of the criminal. In other words,
we are trying to achieve the influence of positive reinforcement
upon the individual in the framework of negative reinforcement.
So the idea of punishment gradually becomes more and more
eclectic and internally inconsistent, because goals of retribution,
deterrence, and reform are certainly not compatible with one an-
other.
3. PUNISHMENT AND TREATMENT
The described ambivalence on the part of society often
results in a compromise where the same old practice of retribution
is going on, but it is given a different name. In almost all modern
systems of criminal justice one is able to detect this euphemistic
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trend. What is called « treatment », « reformation », « resocializa-
tion » is usually but mere imprisonment.
The question of treatment cannot be separated from the
question of punishment, because every treatment is per defini-
tionem an intrusion of privacy. Therefore, today the treatment
can only be started when the person has committed a criminal
acts. The original supposedly clear-cut distinction between crimi-
nal law and statutes in which the State acts as parens patriae
(juvenile delinquents, sexual psychopaths, civil commitment cases,
etc.) has now been replaced by reintroduction of Constitutional
safeguards in these areas according to the model traditionally
accepted in the criminal law. Therefore, from the legal standpoint,
the treatment and punishment are increasingly understood in the
same way, that is, as a deprivation of liberty. The « euphemistic
trend » has been largely reversed.
From the sociological and psychiatric standpoint punishment
can not be clearly distinguished from treatment. Obviously,
the person treated will always understand treatment as punish-
ment, even if he has only to report occasionally to some authority.
Psychiatrists speak about « milieu therapy » and about « con-
sciously structured environment », but whoever has been to a
mental hospital for the criminally insane can see that it functions
essentially as a human warehouse and that there is no treatment
different from the « treatment » that inmates receive in the ordi-
nary prison. Hospitals as well as prisons are understaffed and
this means that an inmate does not receive sufficient attention
to justify the term « treatment ».
In addition to that, the criteria for punishment stem out
of the social harm done by the act, while the criteria for treat-
ment do not depend on a single act, but on the diagnosis of the
offender's personality. Sometimes both of these criteria will result
in the same required time of confinement, but often they will not.
Then the compromise between the two is the criterion of dan-
gerousness. If the person has committed a serious crime or even
repeated it, then he alledgedly needs more treatment, but he also
deserves more punishment. And since there are no firm standards
for the prediction of future dangerousness, the lawyers and psy-
chiatrists are better able to come together. Here the problem
emerges only when the act committed is really trivial but the
8. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)
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person is found highly dangerous and so we get a long sentence
for a trivial act. But this possibility is much smaller than if we
had no compromise criterion of dangerousness.
Then, there are many offenders who are not treatable under
any conditions, psychopaths, for example. In this case, to speak
about treatment is a farce and commitment is reduced to con-
finement, i.e., punishment.
In general, one can say that treatment simply is not suc-
cessful. If there were really effective means of changing the crimi-
nal behavior patterns without intrusions of privacy (see Brody,
1973) punishment would no longer be necessary. If there were
effective means of treatment requiring confinement, there would
be a very low rate of recidivism, and today a high proportion of
the prison population are habitual offenders. And this seems to
be logical : how could a short term treatment not only efface
behavior patterns which needed years to establish themselves as
a logical response to certain kinds of environment, but also prevent
their reemergence after the reinstatement of the offender into his
original environment ?
The rigid distinction between treatment and punishment is
not justifiable either from the standpoint of criminal law, or from
the standpoint of psychiatry and sociology, and least from the
standpoint of the offender.
4. SAFEGUARDS : HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE NEW METHODS OF PUNISHMENT
From the development of behavioral psychology emerges
the idea that punishment in a more sophisticated form (behavior
modification programs, electronic surveillance, opérant condition-
ing, aversive suppression techniques, electronic monitoring, etc.)
can be the way of transforming the undesirable behavior if it
results in criminal activity.
What is really new in these techniques is that they provide
means of consistent negative reinforcement and control, while
the old « techniques », whether called punishment or treatment
were far less consistent. Punishment, as it is traditionally inflicted,
is a comparatively primitive tool of negative reinforcement, too
remote in time from the behavior it is supposed to prevent in the
future, and it is also not connected closely enough with the
respective behavior to establish the instinctive and automatic re-
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pression of the undesirable behavior. The new techniques may
actually require less suffering but have a greater effect. In other
words, we still speak of punishment, only that it is more econo-
mical : smaller effort and greater effect.
These new techniques require less money, promise more
effect, abolish the need for a long confinement, erase the distinc-
tion between punishment and treatment, merge the hostile attitude
with the friendly one (Moad's distinction, infra) and seem to be
horrible enough for the general public to satisfy the same require-
ments as punishment does, and yet the offenders are willing to
accept them. In addition to that, the society which is not able
to eradicate the conditions which produce crime and other social
pathology, and is furthermore not able to abandon punishment
as retribution, while the demand for efficacy is constantly growing
because of the growing problem of crime, will welcome these new
techniques.
The problem, however, is that they conflict with the demand
for the protection of fundamental human rights 9. The liberal
political philosophy, which is still the essence of the modern
State and social consciousness, emphasizes strongly the protection
of human liberty. Legal rules are formal, impersonal, and general
in order to guarantee the equal protection of human rights. While
this equality is formal, not substantial, because it allows for
de facto differences between people, it nevertheless restricts the
State in political abuse and arbitrariness of substantively irra-
tional justice (Weber, 1967, see supra, p. 68).
The role of criminal law is regarded as an inhibition upon
the activity of the State. This view is correct, because obviously,
punishment is possible without criminal law, but not so the pro-
tection of human rights. In the European Continental law this is
expressed in the principle of legality (Legalitàtsprinzip), in Ameri-
can law the same end is achieved through the constant reference
to Constitutional safeguards.
9. « Behavioral modification programs and electronic surveillance
devices are off the drawing board and await only the failure of community-
based treatment programs. Opérant conditioning and aversive suppression
techniques along with electronic monitoring of an individual's behavior
obviously raise the gravest sort of questions concerning human dignity
and liberty. In addition to high claims of efficiency, proponents of their
adoption need only argue that offenders have very few rights now and in
the light of the failure of all other techniques «we at least deserve a
chance » (Cohen, 1972).
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While it was relatively easy to protect human rights when
the reaction of the State to the criminal act was purely punitive,
and therefore related to the objective act and its consequence
and not to the criminal's personality and behavior, this becomes
very difficult if the State is allowed to retain control over the
individual, at least until he changes his behavior, if not his per-
sonality. This smells of totalitarianism and is strongly opposed
by lawyers.
There have been some recent legal developments in American
practice. These developments affect the protection of the rights of
those criminals who really seem to need treatment, because they
are insane or so disturbed that they are not held responsible for
their acts. The essence of these developments is that the due
process requirements are again imposed on commitment pro-
ceedings, while previously the State was acting as parens patriae,
i.e., supposedly in the interest of the committed-to-be and the due
process restrictions were not deemed necessary. « The State is
acting as parens patriae, but the admonition to function in a
« parental » relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbi-
trariness. It has been held that the child is not entitled to bail,
to indictment by grand jury, to a speedy and public trial, to trial
by jury, to immunity against self-incrimination, to confrontation
of his accusers and to counsel (in some states). There is evidence,
in fact, that the child gets the worst of both worlds : that he gets
neither the protection accorded to adults not the solicitous care
and regenerative treatment postulated for children 10. »
This seems to be a representative case in the sense it points
to the new attitude of legal protection even in the cases where
treatment, and not punishment, seemed to be the aim of the
State's action. This attitude seems to be present in juvenile pro-
ceedings, proceedings of civil commitment, etc.11 A fortiori, one
might expect, will it be present in the cases where the distinction
between treatment and punishment is even more blurred.
The most important requirement concerning the distinction
between punishment and treatment, is the requirement of the
10. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
11. Williams v. United States (250 F 2d. 19) (D.C. Cir. 1957);
Lake v. Cameron (331 F 2d. 771) (D.C. Cir. 1964); In re Crosswell's
Petition (28 R. I., 66 A. 55, 58) (1907) ; Jackson v. Indiana (92 S. Ct. 1845)
(1972) ; Wyat v. Stickney (325 F. Supp. 781) (1971) ; In re Gault (387
U.S. 1) (1971).
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act12. Treatment is not required for the act but for the personality,
yet it seems that the requirement of an unlawful act will remain
a condition for treatment as well as punishment. The require-
ment of the act before any criminal or commitment proceedings
can be started is the traditional limitation of the State's right to
intrude the sphere of privacy. This requirement, however, is often
a barrier to the application of the criterion of dangerousness. For
example, in the case of indecent exposure an exhibitionist may
be psychiatrically examined and found potentially dangerous of
more serious offenses and violence. But indecent exposure is a
misdemeanor for which the person will usually be given only a
ninety-day sentence. The State will have to wait until he com-
mits a more serious crime before it will be able to commit him for
a longer period of time and start a treatment. From a different
standpoint, this could be understood as if he had the right to
commit this more serious crime. Robinson v. California was a
decisive case in this respect, where the Supreme Court decided
that a person cannot be punished for mere status (of being a drug
addict in this case). Civil commitment laws tried to bridge this
gap (Maryland's Defective Delinquency Act, for example) but
this trend was reversed in Lessard v. Schmidt13.
5. CONCLUSION
We have seen that punishment originates from an instinctual
response. It has passed into the hands of societal agencies but it has
not entirely changed its nature. Behavioral science has provided
information that would make punishment more effective and more
rational. This trend conflicts with the principle of liberty and this
conflict has occasionally been obscured by the notion of treat-
ment. Today, however, this conflict is more clearly seen. In fact,
the demand for protection of society and the demand for pro-
tection of fundamental human rights are two conflicting aims of
criminal law. The more the problem of crime becomes pressing,
the more is the demand for protection of society emphasized on
account of the demand for protection of human rights. In spite
of that, the American courts have upheld the Constitutional safe-
guards.
The basic conclusion to be made in this respect is that the
effect of punishment on the individual offender, even if it is de-
12. Robinson v. California (370 U.S. 660) (1962).
13. U.S. Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, August 10, 1972.
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fined as treatment, is at best dubious. Consequently, the question
arises, whether punishment can be justified on some other basis.
B. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT
OF NORMATIVE INTEGRATION
We are concerned here with the question of genesis of
morality in the individual, that is, how does the moral distinction
between right and wrong become part of human mind and be-
havior. The concrete contents of this distinction vary from culture
to culture, from society to society and from one group in society
to another. Nevertheless, on a higher level of generality, the
question is how does a child start to distinguish between accepta-
ble and unacceptable on a moral basis.
The concept of morality, collective conscience, or whatever
denotation may be given to this phenomenon, is a social concept.
However, there must be something on the individual level that
brings social morality into concrete life. Although the essence
of the phenomenon of morality in its origin and existence is social,
it can express itself only through individual behavior. Morality,
in other words, is something universal which expresses itself
through the particular. The fact that certain individuals, notably
psychopaths, completely lack certain moral abilities, proves that
there must be this particular psychological counterpart to the
social entity of morality.
Freudian doctrine explains the development of moral judge-
ment through the concept of Oedipus complex. The behaviorist
approach does not conceptualize beyond the simple theory of
opérant behavior. The transactional analysis (Sullivan, Fromm-
Reichmann, Berne, Harris) has merged to some extent both
approaches in its concept of Child (see Harris, 1969). There are,
of course, several other doctrines, notably those of Melanie Klein
(1932), Piaget (1932), and Anna Freud, but here we will focus
only on the Oedipus complex theory, since it is more important
for our purpose to show the existence of the individual process
of normative integration, than to discuss the differences between
several hypothetical theories.
Freud described the idea of Oedipus complex in his work
« The Interpretation of Dreams » (1900). The basic notion is that
the child develops sexual attachment (object cathexis) to the parent
of the opposite sex. At a certain stage of his development he has
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to suppress this love. This suppression runs simultaneously with
the process of growing identification with the parent of the same
sex. This identification makes him internalize certain standards
of behavior and accept them as a part of his own identity. This
acceptance is not critical, it is axiomatic in the sense that the
child yet has not criteria of evaluation and has no possibility to
judge the appropriateness of these values. This identification will
provide the starting point, while, paradoxically, it also « becomes
the affective position to which that individual will tend to return
automatically for the rest of his days •» (see Kubie, 1958).
The suppression of the Oedipus complex is followed, if
the process of suppression is successful, by the formation of the
ego ideal, the superego. Superego is the seat of both our morality
of duty and our morality of aspiration " . This is how our concrete
self acquires its deontological counterpart, a relatively independent
agency which emphasizes « ought to be » in contrast to what « is ».
« Our moral sense is the expression of the tension between the
ego and the superego •» (Freud 1900, p. 201). Superego repre-
sents parents even if their conditioning by love and punishment
is not present any more. It « ... observes, directs, and threatens
ego in exactly the same way as earlier the parents did with the
child» (p. 201).
If all goes well the boy will identify with his father. His
superego will be modeled upon this parental figure. Father will
himself normally be a socially integrated person, i.e., will, him-
self, have his own superego modeled upon his father and in addi-
tion, his behavior and values will be modified according to require-
ments of the social climate in which he lives.
The identification described above is a compensation process
in which the loss of « the intense object cathexes » is replaced
by rewards of pleasing the parents. The better the Oedipus com-
plex is suppressed, the better it transforms into superego. The
better developed the superego, the more receptive is the child for
internalization of moral values. Through identification, the parents
provide the medium between the individual and society and be-
tween the past and the present. « The superego of the child is not
really built upon the model of the parents, but on that of the
parents' superego ; it takes over the same content, it becomes
the vehicle of tradition and of all the age-long values which have
14. This distinction is taken from Lon. L. Fuller (1964).
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been handed down in this way from generation to generation »
(Freud, 1933, p. 95-96 ; see also Laing, 1969, and Jung, 1968,
p. 84).
However, the transformation of the Oedipus complex into
superego is only the form in which the social norms are transfer-
red from one generation to another. The contents of what is trans-
ferred are determined by the past and the immediate social situa-
tion of the family. This is not to say that the social situation does
not influence the intensity of this process too.
Anomie can play two kinds of role here. First, it may be
that the formation of superego as a process has the same inten-
sity, but the norms transferred acquire a more and more asocial
quality. Second, the norms may be socially acceptable, but the
process has lost its intensity. Probably both are happening simul-
taneously. If we speak about the declining importance of the
family structure, it cannot be without consequences on the pro-
cesses that form the child's superego. On the other hand, if an
ever greater part of society declines to accept the social normative
structure, so that there is a widening gap between the social and
cultural structure, we may expect that the values transmitted in
the process of growing up will be in progressively greater dis-
junction with the values needed for the perpetuation of the social
structure.
If it is true that it is the family which is the seat of the basic
integrative processes which link the individual with the society 15,
then, one could argue, the only thing necessary is to strengthen
the family and so increase the human receptiveness for moral
behavior. But family, of course, is no separate entity distinct from
society. The quality of its life reflects the society as a whole since
the impressions of the outer world synthesize themselves in the
psyches of the parents, are themselves synthesized with the super-
ego and transmitted to the children. Throughout history the family
has been one of the strongest institutions. If its viability is declining
today, this would, according to the described doctrine, certainly
15. See Fromm, 1955, p. 79 : * The family... may be considered to
be the psychic agency of society, the institution which has the function of
transmitting the requirements of society to the growing child. The family
fulfills this function in two ways. First,... by the character of the parents...
in addition... the methods of the childhood training, which are customary
in a culture also have the function of molding the character of the child
in a socially desirable fashion. »
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mean that the whole process of normative integration is losing
its intensity.
The formation of superego does not mean that there will
be an immediate introjection of all relevant norms. In this process
superego is merely formed as the child becomes a moral being.
Its content and continued growth are more and more formed by
the society as the child enters into institutions outside the family.
Erikson has extrapolated the basic identification process with the
father to social institutions. Unnecessary to emphasize, this idea
is of paramount importance in understanding the link between
the formation of the individual's ability for normative integration
and the society's influence in giving the appropriate contents to
this form. Social institutions have a relatively independent life
and may be inadequate to the particular social conditions. If the
conditions change, they reflect the past. This inadequacy will reflect
itself either in the lack of the individual's identification with them,
or in the individual's personal crisis if he does. Again, normally
both processes will be present. Together they will form what
Erikson described as an « identity crisis » (1968). There is nothing
that could really be done to change this development, because
every particular process reflects the universal whole, the society.
The question arises, what is the role of the criminal law in
this context ? Can punishment stimulate the identification with the
norms it protects ? There is no clear-cut answer to this question.
As we will see later on, Durkheim and Mead presupposed uni-
versal moral values and consensus about them and conceived of
society as a relatively homogeneous entity. They abandoned the
« power theory » introduced by Hobbes and developed by Hegel.
This enabled them to speak about society without differentiating
between its strata. Therefore, crime and punishment could be
confronted in terms of individual and society.
But if we take different interests of different strata of society
as conflicting, we can no more speak of crime in general terms.
Different norms have different intensities according to the degree
the interests they protect are shared in the society. The degree
of sharing here reflects the social adequacy of protection.
There is a positive correlation between the correspondence
of the norm to the interests of the particular individual and the
chance that this norm will be identified with. There is no need
of the subtle support of the superego for the obvious, concrete
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interests of the individual. Nobody has to be forced to eat, drink,
have a sexual life, communicate with fellow human beings etc.
Superego represents interests that are more abstract and there-
fore not sufficiently concrete to have immediate emotional in-
fluence characteristic of the primary needs. Where the concrete,
immediate interest conflicts with the more abstract and universal
one, the superego plays the decisive role. True, the society will
try to counterbalance the concrete interests with the concrete
counter-interests of avoiding the punishment (this is the essence
of Bentham's utilitarian theory) but, as De Greeff proved, the
psychology of murder depends primarily on the strength of the
superego, not on the fear of punishment.
Therefore, we can say that the superego expresses those
values which represent the individual's own interests on a higher
level of generality : he, for example, has a concrete interest to
kill somebody, but his more abstract interest, because he is a
member of society, is that there would be no killing, because this
would destroy society and him as its member. This kind of rea-
soning is also the basis of the theory of social contract.
To correct this statement we must add that the subjective
element in the evaluation of interests must not be forgotten, other-
wise the norms against the behavior that does not cause any social
damage could not be understood. The pleasure principle of Freud
is not denied by the concept of superego. Superego protects the
individual against social ostracism on the one hand, but on the
other hand it also represents the individual's own more general
interests. Consequently, the superego is not something alien to
the pleasure principle.
Accordingly, we have an interaction between criminal law
norms and punishment on the one hand and the individual and
societal superego (i.e., morality) on the other hand. This inter-
action can be one of mutual reinforcement or mutual enfeeble-
ment. In the last analysis this will depend on the intensity of
correspondence of different interests within society.
Since the criminal law is in the hands of the power stratum
of society, its norms may be in greater or smaller correspondence
with the interests of the other parts of the society. In this respect
frequency and intensity of the violation of norms of the criminal
law will vary in accordance to this lack of correspondence. This
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already explains the criminal law's influence on normative inte-
gration : crime, obviously, is the pure negation of this influence.
Criminal law has no independent role in its attempt to sti-
mulate normative integration. By itself, it cannot form the norms
of moral weight and the withdrawal of its sanction has no im-
mediate impact upon the norm as it lives in the superegos of the
people. A legislative action can anticipate the formation of a new
social practice and new morality, as in traffic legislation, for
instance. In this case the norm of criminal law will easily be
accepted and will have its social life. In case of a contradiction
between the norm and immediate individual interests, everything
depends on the superego. If the superego of an individual has
integrated the norms to a sufficient degree, this will manifest
itself in the lawful behavior.
The essential question is, under what conditions will the
norm reach the superego. Abstracting from the problem of inten-
sity of the Oedipus complex suppression process, we have to deal
here with the quality of the norms that enter the ego ideals of the
individuals. As we said, this depends on the correspondence of
interests. It seems to be true, that the most criminal stratum of
society is the one that is least socially integrated. This means
that its own culture and interests do not correspond to the values
of the larger society. This became obvious in the United States
when all minority groups went through a period of higher crimi-
nality before integration in American society. Another aspect of
the same mechanism is the class aspect : the classes that are
deprived of the benefits of the productive process feel that the
larger society acts against their interests. They have nothing to
lose, and they see that social norms work against them, and they
become aware that it is irrational for them to conform to them 16.
Criminal law represents the interests of those who make it.
Consequently, the smallest conflict between the legal and moral
norm will occur on this level. But it is not entirely wrong to say,
as we do in Continental Strafrechtphilosophie, that the criminal
law is the minimum code of moral standards. The question,
16. In Walpole State Prison I had an opportunity to speak with a
black inmate who had spent fifteen out of thirty-two years of his life in
prison, all for property offenses. He was very class-conscious, and his
philosophy was basically that he has realized the irrationality of abiding
with social norms. He said : « They brought me here to change me, but
nothing can change my attitude, because it is the only possible one. »
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however, is, whose morality does it represent ? The example of
American Prohibition illustrates the connection between the
superego of the legislator and the law17.
In those aren" where the criminal law is in accordance with
the contents of the « class superego » it has a very important role
to play. The frequently cited Sutherland's passage is entirely
wrong :
Laws have accumulated because the mores have been weak
and inconsistent ; and because the laws have not had the
support of the mores they have been relatively ineffective
as a means of control. When the mores ewe adequate, laws
are unnecessary ; when the mores are inadequate, the laws
are ineffective (Sutherland and Cressey, 1960, p. 11 ; em-
phasis added).
Laws have not accumulated because mores would be « inade-
quate » in general. They have been inadequate in relation to the
standards of the one who has made the laws. More important,
« adequate mores » are largely supported by criminal law and
that is how they remain adequate 1S. Bonos mores can be either
Skinner's automatic goodness in the absence of the conflict of
interests, or else they can result from self-restrictions imposed
by internalized morality or even genetically coded inhibitions 1B.
17. Gusfield (1970, p. 64) differentiates between the instrumental and
symbolic function of the legal and governmental designations of deviance.
The symbolic function does not have the same rational component typical
for the instrumental function. In other words, the legislator is not neces-
sarily concerned with the societal situation in a pragmatic way, but often
projects in the law his own ego ideal.
18. Ovidius Naso begins his Metamorphoseon Libri with an admi-
rable hexameter reference to the past : « A urea prima sata est aetas que
vindice nullo, sponte sua sine lege fidem rectumque collebat. » But even
to him, argumento a contrario, it was clear that in society bonos mores
have to be enforced vindice, i.e., by force and punishment.
19. « It is often claimed that moral control of behavior is some-
thing specifically human. It is now abundantly clear... that other species
have developed very effective social controls for inhibiting intraspecies
strife, regulating sexual behavior, looking after young and defending terri-
tory against enemies... The mechanisms underlying these behavioral ana-
logies of morality have evolved biologically ; they derive from genetical
constitution common to the species... The higher the animal in the evolu-
tionary sense, the more these genetically determined mechanisms can be
disrupted by adverse environment factors during development ; moreover,
in the higher mammals, specific attachments or bonds usually formed early
in life play an increasingly important role... In human species, the influence
of genetic constitution is less specific, yet we cannot discount the possibility
that the genetic predisposition facilitates the development of moral con-
trols. We probably underestimate the extent to which we conform to moral
rules spontaneously and without realizing the fact. » (Wright, 1971, p 15,
16, 17).
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(To the extent the genetical inhibitions determine human behavior,
Sutherland may be right. But these are of comparatively small
importance.)
Sutherland's proposition implies the independence of the
individual morality from the social practice. But if it does not
depend on the social pratice, on what does it depend ? Psycholo-
gically, this concept does not fit either in the behaviorist doctrine,
where negative reinforcement represents the instrument of accom-
modation of individual behavior to the demands of social living,
or into the Freudian theory in which the ego ideal grows in social
interaction. The proposition, however, has the positive function
of diminishing the belief that the criminal law is a kind of deus
ex machina which can make people behave « adequately ».
Less influence can be ascribed to criminal law in those parts
of the social structure which cannot succeed in satisfying their
interests in the lawful way. If the people of these classes never-
theless obey the rules of law this can be ascribed only to the
restrictive influence of their superegos. The criminal law and its
threat provide the necessary rationality of this influence and the
support of their internalized morality.
Psychoanalysts have drawn attention to three main motives
in our attitude towards law breakers and criminals that
operate in addition to the conscious reasons that are more
readily recognized... In the first place, the criminal provides
an outlet for our (moralized) aggression. In this respect he
plays the same role as do our enemies in war and our poli-
tical scapegoats in time of peace. That some very real satis-
faction is to be found in this way is shown by the vast
crowds that attended public executions... In the second place,
the criminal, by his flouting of law and moral rule, consti-
tutes a temptation to the id ; it is as though we said to
ourselves, « if he does it, why should not we ?» This calls
for an answering effort on the part of superego which can
best achieve its object by showing that « crime doesn't pay ».
This, in turn, can be done most conveniently and com-
pletely by a demonstration on the person of the criminal.
By punishing him we are not only showing him that « he
can't get away with it » but holding him up as a terrifying
example to our tempted and rebellious selves. Thirdly... is
the danger with which our whole notion of justice is threat-
ened when we observe that a criminal has gone unpunished.
The primitive foundation of this notion... lies in an equili-
brium of pleasures and pains, of indulgence and punish-
ment. This equilibrium is disturbed, either if the moral
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rewards of good conduct are not forthcoming... or if the
normal punishments of crime are absent or uncertain... It is
to prevent disturbance of the latter kind that we insist that
those who have broken the law shall be duly punished.
Through their punishment the equilibrium is re-established,
without it (so we dimly feel) the whole psychological and
social structure on which morality depends is imperiled
(see Flugei, 1955).
C. SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECT
OF NORMATIVE INTEGRATION
1. DURKHEIM'S THEORY
OF COLLECTIVE CONSCIENCE (1893)
Durkheim's definitions of crime, punishment, and normative
integration are logically derived from the concept of collective
conscience 20. His theory of division of labor distinguishes be-
tween mechanical and organic solidarity. Mechanical solidarity,
typical of ancient societies, is sustained by repressive law, organic
solidarity sustained by restitutive law, is characteristic of modern
societies, where the division of labor has developed and where,
accordingly, there is less need for exertion of force because of
the greater structuralization and integration idiosyncratic for the
organic structure of division of labor. The more the division
of labor is developed and the more interdependent are the organic
parts of society, the less need is there to keep society together by
force of repressive law.
But inasmuch as the repressive, i.e., the penal law, is still
needed, the « directive power », i.e., the organs of the State, re-
present the collective sentiments, react on their behalf, enforce
them and defend them. The directive power is « the collective
type incarnate » (Durkheim, 1933, p. 84).
The society is more than the sum of its parts, it is a quality
sui generis. The same holds true for collective conscience and
consequently, even though it lives through individuals, it is more
than the sum of individual consciences. These, when brought
20. Durkheim, 1933, p. 79 : «The totality of beliefs and sentiments
common to average citizens of the same society forms a determinate
system which has its own life ; one may call it the collective conscience
or common conscience... It is by definition diffuse in every reach of so-
ciety... It is, in effect, independent of the particular conditions in which
individuals are placed. »
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together, live in an interplay in which they mutually influence one
another. The collective conscience is transferred from one genera-
tion to another and is relatively independent of the immediate
social situation. Society has its own psyche which is essentially
the same in all its strata, in all geographical parts of the country
where it exists, in all professions 21. Collective conscience is also
given the attribute of transcendence, which in effect manifests its
independence.
Crime is a violation of collective conscience 2~. It must not
be defined in relation to social needs because such a theory
« accords too large a part in the direction of social evolution to
calculation and reflection » (Durkheim, 1933, p. 72) and besides,
there are crimes that are not harmful to the society at all.
To say that crime is a violation of interests as they are
subjectively understood by a particular society, would be a circular
definition, a tautology, because it comes down to saying « that
societies judge these rules necessary because they judge them
necessary » (Durkheim, 1933, p. 73). Only the theory of social
conscience can explain why societies have been so often mistaken
in imposing practices that were not even useful.
However, Durkheim acknowledges that collective conscience
essentially depends on the social needs, when he refers to social
utility 23. Unless, therefore, we assume that Durkheim contradicts
himself, we have to modify his own definition of crime : crime
is violation of social needs, present and past, as expressed through
collective sentiments. The theory of collective conscience does not
21. It is interesting to see how this perception by Durkheim pene-
trated into psychology. It was taken over by Jung who inventend the notion
of « collective unconscious », by which he denotes the archetypes which
are transferred independently even of society and are shared by the
whole humanity. See Jung, 1968.
22. « ... an act is criminal when it offends strong and defined states
of collective conscience » (1933, p. 80). However, Durkheim was not
the first one to express this idea ; by the time The Division of Labor in
Society was written it was at least seventy-two years old. « The fact that
an injury to one member of society is an injury to all others does not
alter the conception of wrong-doing, but it does alter it in respect of its
outward existence as an injury done, an injury which now affects the mind
and consciousness of civil society as a whole, not merely the external
embodiment of the person directly injured. » (Hegel, 1971, p. 140).
23. « ... the collective type is formed from very diverse causes and
even from fortuitous combinations. Produced through historical develop-
ment, it carries the mark of circumstances of every kind which society
has gone through in its history. It would be miraculous, then, if everything
we find there were adjusted to some useful end. But it cannot be that
elements more or less numerous were there introduced without having any
relation to social utility » (Durkheim, 1933, p. 107 ; emphasis added).
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differentiate the various strata of society. Consequently, all in-
criminations manifest the psyche of the society as a whole.
Punishment, for Durkheim, is a passionate reaction. The
more primitive the society, the more this is evident2i. Punish-
ment is not necessarily in accordance with the act, it is often
too harsh, and it, moreover, extends even on persons linked to
the offenderZ5. « It expands in quite mechanical fashion. The
passion which is the soul of punishment ceases only when
exhausted » (Durkheim, 1933, p. 86).
According to Durkheim, this essential quality of punishment
has not been changed in the modern societies. Punishment, how-
ever, has always been a social reaction, even though realized
through individual conscience. This coincides with the religious
nature of the criminal law in ancient societies. What changed is
but the form through which this passion expresses itself : in more
structured society punishment itself becomes subject to division
of labor, and though it remains vengeance, it is enforced through
the organs of the State, through the tribunals. Because society
has become more conscious of the purpose of punishment, it tends
to restrict the passionate component of it. Nevertheless, the cor-
relation expressed in the maxim that « punishment must fit the
crime » still points to the irrational correlation between the strength
24. As we said before, the core of Durkheim's theory in The Divi-
sion of Labor in Society is the distinction between the primitive and ad-
vanced society. The primitive society is characterized by its inorganic
character, i.e., parts of society can be added and taken away without
essential damage to the functioning of society.
Small geographic and demographic extension is characteristic of primitive
society. Consequently, the dominant form of consciousness is mechanical
solidarity. To this corresponds the repressive law.
The advanced society's structure is organic, the units are interdependent,
the geographic and demographic extension are greater, solidarity becomes
organic too. Consciousness becomes increasingly personalized, and the in-
fluence of collective consciousness is decreasing. This society is denned as
an association of traders, and consequently the restitutive law becomes its
characteristic. Although Durkheim contrasts his theory to the utilitarian
one, in the last analysis his own theory rests on the organic solidarity
i.e., complementarity of interests, which is exactly the position taken by
the utilitarian philosophy.
On the basis of shared interests organic solidarity is added to the mechanic
one. Social order is rendered possible on two conditions : 1. Occupational
groups must mediate between the individual and society ; 2. The sanctity
of social norms must be recognized and preserved.
25. This mechanical extension of passion is not limited only to pri-
mitive societies. It is well known that during World War II the Italians
and Germans used to take hostages and execute them in the event one of
their people was killed. Soviet Union also used to enforce the law, which
prescribed punishment for the members of the family and even of the
household of those who defected.
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of sentiments the act offends and the punishment. If totally ra-
tional, punishment would only correspond to the degree of the
corruptness of the criminal, which is not necessarily implied in
the crime committed.
Obviously, Durkheim distinguishes here two kinds of « ra-
tionality ». First, the rationality of the individual reaction to the
crime, the aim of which should be the transformation of the
criminal, and second, the rationality of the passion, which in fact
sustains the existing collective sentiments and their integrative
function.
The second proof of the passionate nature of punishment is
the spontaneous social reaction to the crime « which often serves
no purpose » and doubles the punishment. This is how the
collective sentiments spontaneously reinforce themselves (supra,
p. 83, 84). Since the punishment has been delegated to an official
organ, it is somehow alienated from the society and the collective
sentiments do not exhaust themselves through official punishment
so that they have to express themselves in the spontaneous aggres-
sive reaction.
Therefore, even if punishment is a passionate reaction and
seems irrational in relation to the particular offender, it still serves
a very important function ; it reinforces the same collective senti-
ments that have produced it.
Some crimes do not offend directly the collective sentiments,
but they offend the organ which represents them (mala prohibita).
It is, according to Durkheim, the same force that is offended in
both cases. This force « is the product of the most essential social
likenesses, and has for its effect the maintenance of the social
cohesion which results from these likenesses ». Durkheim recog-
nizes the important effect punishment has upon the preservation
of social cohesion. He assumes that all the values protected by the
criminal law are the manifestation of collective sentiments and
that every act which violates these norms is a threat to social
cohesion. Obviously, the underlying presumption must be, that
society is a homogeneous structure and that the criminal law with
its enforcement agencies is merely an organ of these collective
sentiments.
The natural inference to be made from the Durkheim
theory is that the enforcement of the criminal law is far more
important for those who respect it, than it is for offenders. It
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has much more influence on the law-abiding population, than it
has on the criminal one. The chance that the offender will be
transformed is relatively small, however, this does not render the
punishment purposeless. Since collective sentiments live through
mutual reinforcement, it is important that every violation be
punished 26.
For Durkheim, then, the really important role of the crimi-
nal law is to protect social cohesion « against all enfeeblement ».
The criminal law achieves that through demanding from each
of us a minimum of resemblances without which the individual
would be a menace to the unity of the social body, and in
imposing upon us the respect for the symbol which expresses and
summarizes these resemblances at the same time it guarantees
them » (Durkheim, 1933, p. 106).
For him, then, the criminal law enforces the minimum of
conformity required from the individual. Conformity, here, is not
directly related to social needs, but to collective sentiments that
express them more or less accurately.
Even those collective sentiments that serve no apparent
social need must be protected because they are social links and
if they are destroyed this would harm social cohesion.
Punishment, consequently, is not only the consequence of
living collective sentiments, but also their cause, since it brings
them back to life. There is a dialectical relationship between
social conscience and the enforcement of the criminal law.
26. Kant, 1929, p. 15 : « Judicial punishment... can never serve
merely as a means to further another good, whether for the offender him-
self or for society, but must always be inflicted on him for the sole reason
that he has committed a crime... The law of punishment is a categorical
imperative, and woe to him who crawls through the serpentine windings
of the happiness theory seeking to discover something which in virtue of
the benefit it promises will release him from the duty of punishment or
even from the fraction of its full severity. »
Kant, 1853, p. 35 : « L'impératif catégorique, qui en général n'exprime
qu'une seule chose, ce qui est obligatoire, se formule ainsi : agis suivant
une maxime qui puisse avoir en même temps la valeur d'une loi univer-
selle. Ainsi, après avoir considéré d'abord tes actions dans leur principe
subjectif, tu ne pourras reconnaître qu'il a aussi une valeur objective... »
Kant's theory of punishment as a categorical imperative has often been
considered intuitive and impossible either to prove or to deny, if not irra-
tional.
But here we see how well it corresponds to Durkheim's theory. Both
Kant and Durkheim, deny the importance of social needs, but while Dur-
kheim takes them into account through his concept of social utility (1933,
p. 107) and so tries to consider them at least indirectly, Kant writes as a
spokesman for collective sentiments without trying to explain them and
taking essentially an agnostic point of view (see Kant, 1853, p. 36).
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There are two basic mistakes in Durkheim's theory. First,
he takes the society as non-class structure. Second, consequently,
he sanctifies the social norm.
Sanctification of actuality appears in almost all of the princi-
pal classical social theories. Even in Hegel, critical thought is
abandoned in the last analysis and the State is rationalized in its
function. The same happens in Durkheim's theory, where the
directive power is the true representation of collective sentiments.
Today, however, this view is largely criticized, the social norms
are critically examined and consequently the problem of the rela-
tion between the consciousness and actuality, essentially a meta-
physical question, is reemerging (see Chomsky, 1971). Durkheim
ignores these questions, and therefore his theory, as a whole,
although he offers concepts with great explanatory powers, is not
correct. However, if our problem is limited and practical, i.e., if
we limit ourselves to the problem of the preservation of the status
quo, as we do, since the question of the criminal law's influence
on the normative integration implies the acceptance of the validity
of the norms expressed in the criminal law, then we may well use
Durkheim's reasoning. But the moment we embark on the dis-
cussion of relationship between the collective conscience and
reality, where it may appear that the dominant consciousness is
not adequate (the disjunction between the social and cultural
structure), Durkheim's theory cannot be accepted any more. And
since anomie is actually the absence of certain collective senti-
ments, it would follow from Durkheim's doctrine that they can
be brought back to life by punishment, which is simply not true.
So we may use this theory only to the extent that collective senti-
ments really exist ; their absence cannot be explained 27.
If we accept Durkheim's doctrine, moreover, the criminal
will necessarily be defined as « deviate », « abnormal », « in-
27. The criticism of the dominant form of collective consciousness
is evident in the works of R. D. Laing. He often assumes that it is the
social conscience which is inadequate and if the individual reacts to it
with a distorted perception of reality, this is an adequate reaction.
Fromm also takes the same standpoint. « It is naively assumed that the
fact that the majority of people share certain ideas or feelings proves the
validity of these ideas and feelings. Nothing is further from truth. Con-
sensual validation as such has no bearing whatsoever on reason or mental
health. Just as there is a « folie à deux » there is « folie à millions ». The
fact that millions of people share the same vices does not make these
vices virtues, the fact that they share so many errors does not make the
errors to be truths, and the fact that millions of people share the same
forms of mental pathology does not make these people sane » (Fromm,
1955, p. 23).
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sane », etc., because, according to Durkheim, the moral conscience
of the nation is datum, is right, and all that diverges from it is
wrong. As far as aetiology of crime goes, then, it would have
to be found exclusively with the individual, not with the society.
The Italian Scuola positiva rests on the exact same presumption,
although it does not follow Durkheim's recommendations con-
cerning punishment.
Society, of course, is no homogeneous entity. It is stratified
according to inequalities produced by the right to equality. The
previous stratification based on birth and in which social power
was distributed in a comparatively constant fashion according to
the « highness » of birth, is replaced by formal equality, which,
coupled with the inequalities of human nature, produces a new
distribution of power. Once this is accomplished it perpetuates
itself, not through the rigid standard of birth, but through pro-
cesses that influence the growth and development of human abili-
ties. It is true that the mobility, the vertical mobility, is much
greater, but the initial power structure tends to perpetuate itself.
This eo ipso generates the conflict of interests, and though the
upper strata morality tends to be the dominant morality of society
distributed through the social structure, it is less and less accepted
by other classes when the historical postulate of the particular
social order is accomplished.
We cannot speak of social consciousness as if it were the
same in all the classes. Crime would be an exceptional phenomenon
of the individual pathology, if there were an overall moral agree-
ment in the society.
Consequently, it simply is not possible to explain all incrimi-
nations as the resultance of collective sentiments. While Durkheim
accepts the gradation of crimes according to the intensity of the
collective sentiments they offend, he does not take into account
another dimension of the question. It is not only that collective
sentiments of the society are more or less strong : this gradation
cannot be drawn through the society as a whole. The majority
of sentiments are formed according to the concrete interests of
the particular social stratum. Social conscience is not pervasive,
it is different for the different interest groups. The crime appears
in various degrees in different social strata.
Obviously, it is the upper power strata that dictate the
stronger social conscience and have the means to make it the
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only one that can be publicly defended. Criminal law and its rules
express these sentiments and interests, and not the sentiments
and interests of the other social strata or of the society as a
whole. Inasmuch as these differ from the sentiments and interests
of other social strata, the crime will occur as a regular phenome-
non. Crime can be defined as an attempt to achieve substantial
justice in the society of formal justice.
Durkheim invents a fiction that even mala prohibita offend
collective sentiments, simply because they offend their truly repre-
sentative organ. This fiction enables him to say that the entire
criminal law is a manifestation of collective conscience. This
would be true if his previous assumption of the society as a
homogeneous structure in respect of interests, were also true. But
if the criminal law defends primarily the interests of the upper
power strata, and the societal interests inasmuch as they are in
accordance with the previous ones, it cannot be said that all in-
fractions of the rules of the criminal law, are infractions of the
social collective conscience.
Durkheim tries to find a common denominator to all the
crimes. He tries to define crime through punishment, because,
he says, the common consequence means the common cause.
Apart from the fact that this is a logical fallacy, it is not true
that the punishment in all the cases is the same expression of
collective conscience. The punishment of the members of the
Spanish revolutionary movement, for example, cannot be equated
with the punishment of the murderer.
There is nothing intrinsically criminal common to all the
behavior denoted « criminal » by the criminal law. Crime cannot
be a scientific entity 2S, not only because there are tremendous
aetiological differences between different criminal acts, but be-
cause there is no phenomenological common denominator. How
could there be one, if crime is literally made by the legislature,
except if we take the legislature as the function of some intrinsic
consistent social mechanisms. Consequently, if one tries to define
all the crimes in one concept, one is bound to use a circular legal
definition. And since definitio ne sit in orbem this is no definition
28. « Willing seems to me to be above all something complicated,
something that is a unit only as a word — and it is precisely in this one
word that the popular prejudice lurks, which has the always inadequate
caution of philosophers » (Nietzsche, 1966, p. 25). If we replace the word
« will » by the word « crime », and perhaps « philosophers » with « jurists »
we see the problem.
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at all, merely a denotation. Modern criminology is seeking to
establish a new approach through the concept of deviance, and
deviance can obviously be denned only in relation to the greatest
possible homogeneous group, never in relation to the norms
formally proclaimed by the « directive power ».
Durkheim claims to use only a descriptive approach in his
sociological writing. But he becomes normative, prescriptive the
moment he assumes that « the organs » truly represent collective
sentiments even though they may not exist in the apparent reality.
2. G. H. MEAD AND HIS THEORY
OF PUNITIVE JUSTICE (1918)
Mead's theory belongs to the broader framework of the
theory of symbolical interactionism. This doctrine is connected
with the pragmatic philosophy and psychology of William James
and is denoted, in an even broader context, as behaviorist2!).
Contrary to Durkheim, Mead dealt with smaller groups and
his theory's starting point is not society as a whole. Further-
more, he regarded society as « nothing but the sum total of the
social experiences of all its individual member » (Mead, 1934,
p. 276). Mead founded his doctrine on the psychological theory
of Wilhelm Wundt from which he took the concept of « gesture ».
Speaking developmental^, gesture stands between action and
speech. Speech is denned in terms of « verbal gestures », and mind
can exist only through verbal gestures, because consciousness is
nothing but internal talk with oneself. This talk is bound to verbal
gestures, called significant symbols.
« Role taking » is another fundamental concept founded on
significant symbols, because their playing means taking the role
of one's fellow-men. Role taking is the socializing process in
which human personality molds itself.
Infrahuman behavior is a result of modified instincts. Modi-
fication comes through experience, and when this experience is
social, instincts are organized so as to allow social Me.
29. See Goricar, p. 62. Compare Marx and Engels, 1970, p. 51 :
« Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness
that exists also for other men, and for that reason alone it really exists
for me personally as well ; language, like consciousness, only arises from
the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men. Where there exists
a relationship, it exists for me : the animal does not enter into relations
with anything, it does not enter into any relation at all... Consciousness is,
therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as
long as men exist at all. »
92 ACTA CRIMINOLOGICA
The basic question presented in Mead's theory is, how to
find the way in which the hostile instincts could express them-
selves without causing social damage. He applies this theory also
to the question of war (the article was published in 1918) and
to the question of punitive justice.
As to the latter problem, social damage is manifested by the
fact that the hostile attitude makes it impossible to resocialize the
offender. Punishment as an expression of the hostile attitude is
incompatible with the goal of resocialization. Emotional attitude
expressed in the « majesty of law » in the legal battle, corresponds
to the hostile instinct. It serves 1) « to exile the rebellious indivi-
dual from the group » and 2) « to awaken in law-abiding mem-
bers of society the inhibitions which make rebellion impossible
to them. The formulation of these inhibitions is the basis of crimi-
nal law. •»
The impulses which identify us with the predominant group
are concrete although the values they protect and represent may
be abstract, that is, « are negatively and abstractly conceived »
(Mead, 1918). Here, the difference between Mead and Durkheim
becomes obvious. While Durkheim deals with the problem of
normative integration on a higher level of abstraction and allows
more abstract conceptions to support his theory of reinforcement
of collective conscience, Mead deals with smaller groups and indi-
viduals and does not accept the possibility that social conscience
could be influenced by specific mechanisms of its own.
For Mead only the concrete impulses, concrete emotions
are capable of reinforcement of our feeling that we are part of
the predominant whole.
Therefore, we may say that both Durkheim and Mead recog-
nize the influence of the criminal law upon normative integration,
only on different levels of generality. We may mention here that
both still use causal analysis to a large extent, but Mead's theory
is even more one-dimensional. The true structural approach is
not typical for either of them. However, Mead has a much less
rigid approach. Durkheim defends the function of punishment
almost unconditionally, whereas Mead saw very well that there is
an inevitable incompatibility between reinforcing the collective
conscience and the concrete aims of punishment. He also realized
that the change in social policy from punishment to more efficient
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solutions is not merely a question of reason. « Opinions are pro-
found social attitudes» (Mead, 1918, p. 589) 3n.
It is true that punishment unites « members of the commu-
nity in the emotional solidarity of aggression » (p. 591). But this
hostile attitude provides no « principles for eradication of crime »
(p. 590). It is true that society in fact profits from the criminal,
because the hostile attitude « reveals common universal values »
and « seemingly without the criminal the cohesiveness of society
would disappear » (p. 591). On the other hand, there are more
and more interests that the members of society have in common
and the growing consciousness about them tends to modify this
hostile attitude. Hostility may be useful as a unifying factor but
it also increases internal intolerance and therefore represses indivi-
duality. It is important to see here that Mead deals with interests.
In society where the members have no interests in com-
mon, there can be no law, because there can be no agreement as
to the procedure of arriving at the rules, and there are no com-
mon criteria for the interpretation of rules. In society where all
the existing interests would be common interests, where there
would be no conflict between the private interests and public
interests, no law is needed. In society where some interests are
shared and some are not, the law will determine the limits of
every interest. Mead is, then, right to say, that the more interests
are shared the less need is there for the hostile attitude. « If any
two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot
both enjoy, they become enemies ; and in the way to their end,
which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their
delectation only, endeavor to destroy or subdue one another »
(Hobbes, 1909, p. 105). « During the time men live without a
common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition
which is called war, and such a war as is of every man against
every man » (p. 106).
From this conflict of interests derives another antinomy.
Social solidarity rests on the hostile attitude. The hostile attitude
is therefore the basis of social organization. The same hostile
attitude produces crime and tries to eradicate it. The positive atti-
30. See also Kadish, 1967, p. 68 : « Perhaps part of the explana-
tion of the lack of success is the inherent limitation of any rational appeal
against a course of conduct which is moved by powerful irrational drives. »
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tude towards individual offenders is, however, incompatible with
the negative attitude.
The system of criminal justice illustrates well this propo-
sition. We want the criminal punished and bettered at the same
time. When, however, we have to choose between these two
alternatives, we invariably choose punishment. This makes it easy
to understand the enormous dimension of social hypocrisy which
tries to interpret punishment as treatment. We came so far that
often, from the point of view of human rights' protection, we
prefer punishment to treatment (see Cohen, 1972)31.
Mead tries to go one step further from Durkheim. « What
sort of emotional solidarity can we secure to replace that [the
hostile attitude] which the traditional procedures have supplied ? »
(Mead, 1918, p. 504). Through criminal law and its enforcement
the values are represented negatively, but it would be more ra-
tional to find a way « towards a functional self-assertion » (p. 504).
The answer, for Mead, is communication between individuals and
groups, « of overcoming temporal and spatial separations of men
so that they are brought into closer interrelation with each
other » (p. 504).
But communication, of course, is possible only if the interests
do not conflict. If it is true that opinions are profound social
attitudes and that these attitudes are influenced by interests, it
follows that so long as interests will conflict, the attitudes and
opinions will conflict too. If the attitudes and opinions conflict,
communication is not possible, because we get two monologues
instead of dialogue, mutual denial instead of mutual self-assertion.
In this respect Mead's doctrine is similar to Durkheim's.
What Durkheim described as the progress from mechanic soli-
darity to the organic exists in Mead's theory as the progress from
the hostile attitude to the friendly one. However, Durkheim is
more explicit as to the causes of this progress : the mutual inter-
dependence caused by shared interests and enhanced by the me-
diation of occupational groups and sanctification of the norm.
31. See also Hegel, 1971, p. 71 : «... Punishment is regarded as
containing the criminal's right and hence by being punished he is honoured
as a rational being. He does not receive this due of honor unless the
concept and measure of his punishment are derived from his own act. Still
less doss he receive it if he is treated either as a harmful animal who has
to be made harmless, or with a view to deterring and reforming him. »
(Emphasis added.)
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Mead saw a great hope and a good sign in the juvenile
proceedings which started to develop in his time. He would be
disappointed to see how the treatment attitude towards delinquents
degenerated into punishment and how in the end the hostile atti-
tude prevailed 32.
Mead's basic thesis that « as the field of constructive social
activity widens the operation of the hostile impulse decreases »
is entirely acceptable. His excellent presentation of the double
role of criminal law, that is, its attempt to achieve positive results
with negative means, is confirmed today by many critics in theory
of criminal law. The eclectic and disoriented nature of criminal
law, undecided whether to punish or to treat and trying both at
the same time, is evident. Mead's analysis also proves, as does
that of Durkheim, that we must not embark unconditionally on
the ideal of treatment forgetting at the same time the moral
influence of punishment upon the social conscience.
Mead fails, however, to explain under what social conditions
will the constructive social activity widen. Implicit in his doctrine
is the theory of conflict of interests. Therefore, the question arises,
under what conditions will the quantity of interest conflicts de-
crease ? And this question remains unanswered.
CONCLUSION
We have examined some of the conditions upon which, if
we accept the hypothesis, criminal law will have an influence upon
normative integration. The basic condition is that there already
should exist a certain intensity of normative integration, if crimi-
nal law is to influence its further reinforcement, or at least to
sustain it.
Criminal law cannot create norms that would actually func-
tion in society, unless there is an essential correspondence between
these norms and social needs. In other words, criminal law can
play the role of catalyst but not the role of creator of normative
integration. « In the case of mala per se the law supports the
moral codes of society... in the case of mala quia prohibita the
law stands alone » (Andenaes, 1971, p. 81).
The pure Skinnerian interpretation can only be applied in
the case of mala prohibita, where there, in fact, is no normative
32. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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integration yet. In mala in se, as the term suggests, there already
is some social acceptance of the norm and the function for the
criminal law to perform is to make it clear that the norms cannot
be violated and thereby to reinforce already existing moral feelings
in the law-abiding citizens. We may complain about the negative
influence of the social stigmatization because it hinders the re-
integration of the offender into society, but this negative social
reaction is a sign that the respective norm is still alive.
The restraint created by the social norm may function on
the conscious or on the unconscious level. In the case of mala in
se the potential offender is not restrained by internalized inhibi-
tions, therefore his « decision making process » operates on the
conscious level. He has to decide what chance there is to be
caught and punished and what kind of punishment he risks, and
weigh this against the « profit » expected from the act. Obviously,
in this case it is important that he knows the prescribed penalty,
although it might be better if he does not know the chances that
he will be caught, because they are often so low.
In the case of an integrated norm these psychological mecha-
nisms do not operate, because rational considerations are inhibited
by moral standards internalized by the potential offender. We can
imagine that there would be more crime if people made decisions
« to commit or not to commit » the criminal acts on the described
rational basis. In fact, this is probably the difference between
the American and European situation : American society is sub-
ject to less inhibitions than the European one (see Slater, 1970,
p. 13-14).
It is difficult to see how the complex processes of normative
integration could be empirically measured and hypotheses, as the
one described in this work, verified. Apart from the general
problem of quantification of social and psychological phenomena
and the fact that both in the sociological and psychological field
the majority of theories are still in the hypothetical stage of
development, there is an enormous complexity of different factors,
complexity which is almost impossible to be understood in a static
way. (Kierkegaard said that consciousness can never be discovered
by examining brain cells under the microscope).
The process of normative integration is the interaction of
virtually all the factors of social life. Statistical techniques of
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finding correlations between the different factors suffer from the
fact that the factors are in majority of cases impossible to quanti-
fy and that many of the factors are simply not yet discovered.
Very similar to this problem is the one of the Marxist social
theory. The methodological postulate of the Marxist doctrine is
the dialectical approach, and yet, in fact, the theory is one of
economic reductionism, so that in the last analysis the dialectical
approach is betrayed and exchanged for causal analysis (compare
Schumpeter, 1937).
We may identify certain important connections, as for
example, the connection between the interests and needs on the
one hand and morality on the other. However, this link is
established on a very high level of abstraction and is empoverished
to the extent to which abstraction implies the neglect of some
other less constant, but in the concrete life, equally important,
factors.
Modern, especially American, social science, tries to exa-
mine society as an objective phenomenon. This postulate was
declared by Durkheim and Weber who tried to devise some instru-
ments (« ideal types », for example) in which the consciousness
of the observer would not affect the assignment of meaning to
soical phenomena 33.
However, no social phenomenon can be separated from the
political context to which it is subject through the conflict of
interests. The problem of normative integration cannot be exa-
mined outside this context and if we try to ignore the fact that
crime is not simply a question of poverty and punishment, we
will never be able to recognize that the social order as such
generates anomie and that social consciousness simply does not
correspond to the stage of development of society any more. This
statement, of course, implies that there is not much to be done
against crime and so also implies that criminology and criminal
law are not very important. Consequently, one must expect all
the possible opposition from criminologists and jurists, because
this affects their own social importance.
33. «... our mental constitution permits us to arrive at knowledge
of the world insofar as our innate capacity to create theories happens to
match some aspect of the structure of the world... A system of knowledge
and belief results from the interplay of innate mechanisms, genetically
determined maturational processes, and interaction with the social and
physical environment» (Chomsky, 1971, p. 20-21).
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The intensity of the influence of criminal law upon normative
integration corresponds to the amount of social norms that were
not yet affected by anomic processes. Criminal law inhibits those
processes in the areas where social norms correspond to social
needs. Where it defends the interests of one interest group against
another, criminal law « stands alone » at least in the group in
which it is against group interests. And since normative integration
is mutual reinforcement, a dialectical process between official
enforcement of the norm and the interest, criminal law can have
an enhancing influence on the normative integration if there is
the needed correspondence, or it may even speed up the anomic
processes in the case of the lack of this correspondence.
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ABSTRACTS
INFLUENCE DE LA JUSTICE CRIMINELLE
SUR L'INTÉGRATION NORMATIVE
Ce document est séparé en trois parties : 1) la théorie de la peine ;
2) l'aspect psychologique de l'intégration normative ; 3) l'aspect sociologique
de l'intégration normative. Il trace les grandes lignes des propositions
suivantes.
1. L'ordre social engendre l'anomie, si la structure sociale et la con-
science sociale dominante ne correspondent pas au degré de développement
de la société.
2. L'anomie affecte la société dans son ensemble, mais l'intensité du
processus anomique varie selon les divergences entre les intérêts d'une
strate sociale particulière et les intérêts représentés par la justice criminelle.
3. Le processus anomique démontre la nécessité du changement dans
la structure normative de la société. Il ne réussit pas cependant à faire la
différence entre les normes socialement utiles et celles qui ne le sont pas.
4. La structure sociale normative dominante est un système forte-
ment articulé. Comme tel il ne peut changer que dans son ensemble et
non pas de façon partielle. Le choix doit être fait, soit de la défendre
comme un tout, ou de ne pas la défendre du tout.
5. La structure normative, à ce moment doit être défendue en tant
que tout, particulièrement parce que le processus anomique l'attaque en
tant que tout.
6. Le droit pénal influence les sentiments collectifs à travers la peine.
Plus le sentiment collectif est intense plus il est renforcé par la punition.
Si cette intensité n'est pas assez forte, la peine ne fera que dissimuler
l'anomie ou même catalysera le processus anomique.
7. L'influence de la peine n'est pertinente qu'en fonction des citoyens
qui respectent les lois, parce que c'est là que le sentiment collectif est suf-
fisamment intense.
8. Le manque d'identification au système normatif dominant a affecté
la théorie sociale et ceux qui sont chargés de faire respecter la loi. Cette
tendance liée à la concentration de l'attention sur des délinquants, produit
ou tend à produire une application de la justice criminelle moralement
neutre.
9. Si nous voulons que la peine ait une influence positive sur l'inté-
gration normative, si nous voulons que la peine soutienne le sentiment
collectif il faudrait que sa connotation morale soit préservée.
10. Toutefois, la peine n'est pas une solution au problème de l'ano-
mie. Dans le système de justice actuel, elle peut le diriger vers différents
secteurs de la vie sociale ou le forcer à changer. Devant les besoins tou-jours plus grands de changement des valeurs et structures sociales, ses buts
devraient être de défendre les valeurs sociales de base qui expriment les
besoins de la société entière. Cependant elle ne peut défendre ces valeurs
qu'en défendant le système normatif dans son entier, l'anomie ne pouvant
se développer dans certains secteurs sans affecter les points vitaux de la
structure normative.
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11. En conséquence l'application de la justice criminelle aura néces-
sairement un effet ambivalent : elle intensifiera l'intégration normative de
certaines normes à l'intérieur de certains secteurs de la société, et en même
temps elle augmentera Panomie de certaines normes dans d'autres strates
sociales.
DERECHO PENAL Y SU INFLUENCIA
SOBRE LA INTEGRACIÔN NORMATIVA
Este articulo esta dividido en très secciones : 1) teoria de la puniciôn ;
2) aspectos psicolôgicos de la integraciôn normativa ; 3) aspectos sociolôgicos
de la integraciôn normativa. Sus grandes Hneas corresponden a las propuestas
siguientes :
1. El orden social engendra la anomia si la estructura social y la con-
ciencia social dominante no corresponden al estado de desarrollo de la sociedad.
2. La anomia afecta a la sociedad considerada como un todo, pero la
intensidad del proceso anômico varia segun la discrepancia entre los intereses
de un estrato particular de la sociedad y los que représenta el derecho penal.
3. El proceso anômico indica la necesidad de cambio en la estructura
normativa de la sociedad, pero no permite, sin embargo, diferenciar las normas
socialmente utiles y las que no lo son.
4. La estructura normativa dominante de la sociedad es un sistema alta-
mente articulado y, como tal, no puede cambiar parcialmente sino como un
conjunto. Hay que escoger, pues, entre defenderlo como un todo o no defenderlo.
5. Por consiguiente, la estructura normativa debe defenderse como un
todo, especialmente porque el proceso anômico la ataca como un todo.
6. Por lo que se refiere a la puniciôn, el derecho penal ejerce una in-
fluencia sobre los sentimientos colectivos. La puniciôn refuerza dichos senti-
mientos en la medida en que éstos poseen un nivel de intensidad suficiente.
Si el nivel de intensidad no es suficiente, la puniciôn solo reducirâ la visibi-
lidad de la anomia o actuarà como catalizador del proceso anômico.
7. Por consiguiente, la influencia del castigo dependerâ en primer lugar
de las expectativas légales de la poblaciôn, ya que es aqui donde los senti-
mientos colectivos son suficientemente intensos.
8. La ausencia de identificaciôn con el sistema normativo prédominante
ha afectado a la teoria social y a los organismos que aplican el derecho penal.
Esta tendencia, junto a la concentràciôn de atenciôn respecta al delincuente, ha
producido o tiende a producir una aplicaciôn moralmente neutra del derecho
penal.
9. Si se quiere que la puniciôn ejerza una influencia positiva sobre la
integraciôn normativa, si se desea que el castigo sostenga o refuerce los senti-
mientos colectivos, debe preservarse la connotaciôn moral del castigo.
10. Sin embargo, la puniciôn no es la solucion al problema de la anomia.
En un sistema de justicia formai, puede canalizarla a través de diversas âreas
de la vida social u obligarla a adoptar una forma diferente. En la situaciôn de
necesidad de cambio de la estructura y valores sociales, que avanzaria pro-
gresivamente, su finalidad debe ser la defensa de los valores sociales bâsicos
que representan las necesidades de la sociedad considerada como un conjunto.
Sin embargo, puede defenderlas ûnicamente defendiendo el sistema normativo
considerado como un todo, ya que la anomia no puede desarrollarse en diversas
âreas sin afectar a los centras vitales de la estructura normativa.
11. Por consiguiente, la aplicaciôn del derecho penal tendra necesaria-
mente un efecto ambivalente : intensificarâ la integraciôn normativa de algunas
normas en determinados estratos de la sociedad y al mismo tiempo reforzarâ
la anomia de otras normas en otros estratos de la misma sociedad.
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STRASRECHT UND DEREN
EINFLUSS ÙBER NORMATIVER INTEGRATION
Die Arbeit ist in drei Teile untergliedert : 1) die Théorie der Strafe ;
2) Psychologische Aspekte normativer Integration ; 3) Soziologische Aspekte
normativer Integration. Folgende Thesen werden untersucht.
1. Die Gesellschaftliche Ordnung erzeugt Anomie, wenn die gesell-
schaftliche Struktur und das herrschende gesellschaftliche Gewissen nicht
der Entwiclungsstufe der Gesellschaft entsprenchen.
2. Die Anomie beeintrâchtigt die Gesellschaft als ganzes ; ihre Inten-
sitàt jedoch ândert sich je nach dem Spannungsverhàltnis zwischen den
Interessen der besonderen Interessenschicht in der Gesellschaft und den
Interessen, die im Strafrecht reprasentiert werden.
3. Anomische Prozesse weisen auf die Notwendigkeit, die gesell-
schaftliche Struktur zu ândern. Sie vermôgen jedoch nicht zwischen solchen
Normen, die von sozialen Nutzen sind und solchen, die es nicht sind, zu
unterscheiden.
4. Die normative Struktur einer Gesellschaft ist ein System inten-
siver Interdependent. Demnach kann es nur vollkommen sich ândern und
nicht in Einzelteilen. Die Entscheidung ist zu treffen, ob es als ganzes zu
verteidigen ist oder ob es iiberhaupt nicht verteidigenswert ist.
5. Die normative Struktur ist demgemâQ als ganzes zu verteidigen,
insbesondere da die anomischen Prozesse sie als ganzes angreifen.
6. Strafrecht ubt iiber die Strafe EinfluS auf kollektive Gefiihle aus.
Strafrecht bestarkt kollektive Gefiihle insoweit als sie von geniigender
Intensitàt sind. Wenm die Intensitatsstufe nicht hoch genug ist, kann die
Bestrafung nur entweder die Sichtbarkeit der Anomie verringern oder sogar
die anomischen Prozesse als Katalysator vergrogern.
7. Der Einflufi der Bestrafung ist damit von Bedeutung im wesen-
tliche im Verhàltnis zur rechstreuen Bevôlkerung, da dort die kollektiven
Gefiihle ausreichend intensiv sind.
8. Gesellschaftstheorie und die Behorden, die das Strafrecht anwen-
den und durchsetzen, identifizieren sich in geringem Umfang mit dem vor-
herrschenden normativen System. Dièse Tendenz, verbunden mit der Bli-
ckrichtung auf den individuellen Rechtsbrecher, hat bewirkt — oder bewirkt
— eine Anweodung des Strafrechts, die moralisch neutral ist.
9. Wenn die Strafe einen positiven Einflug auf die normative Inte-
gration haben soil, wenn die Strafe die kollektiven Gefiihle erhateen oder
in ihrer Intensitàt erweitern soil, mug der moralise Aspekt der Strafe
erhalten bleiben.
10. Bestrafung ist jedoch keine Lôsung fiir das Problem der Anomie.
In einem system formaler Gerechtigkeit kann es die Anomie in ver-
schiedene Bereiche gesellschaftlichen Lebens treiben oder sie veranlassen,
verschiedene Formen anzunehmen. In einer Situation in der das Bediirfnis
nach einer Anderunge der Struktur von Gesellschaft und Werten zuneh-
mend wâchst, mu6 dar Zweck der Strafe es sein, die Grundwerte zu ver-
teidigen, die Bediirfnisse der Gesamtgesellschaft ausdriicken. Die Strafe
kann sie jedoch nur verteidigen, in das ganze normative System als solches
verteidigt wird, da Anomie sich nicht in einigen Bereichen entwickeln
kann, ohne die Lebens nerven der normativen Struktur zu beeintrachtigen.
11. Dementsprechend wird die Anwendung und Durchsetzung des
Strafrechtes eine zweischneidige Wirkung haben : es wird die normative
Integrationswirkung fiir manche Vorschriften innerhalb bestimmter sozialer
Schichten vergrôftern und es wird gleichzeitig in anderen Schichten die
Anomie in Bezug auf andere Normen erweitern.
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УГОЛОВНОЕ ПРАВО И ЕГО ВЛИЯНИЕ
НА НОРМАТИВНУЮ ИНТЕГРАЦИЮ
Эта статья делится на три части : 1) Теория Наказания; 2) Пси-
хологический аспект нормативной интеграции; 3) Социологический аспект
нормативной интеграции. Б ней рассматриваются в общих чертах следующие
предложения.
1. Социальный строй порождает аномию, когда социальная структура
и доминирующая социальная сознательность не соответствуют степени раз-
вития общества.
2. Аномия влияет на общество полностью, но интенсивность анемиче-
ских процессов изменяется в зависимости от различий (противоречий, не-
сходств) между интересами особого слоя общества и интересами, изложен-
ными в уголовном праве.
3. Аномические процессы служат признаком необходимости изменения
нормативной структуры общества. Тем не менее им не удается различие
между нормами, которые полезны для общества, и теми, которые для него
не полезны.
4. Господствующая нормативная структура общества является весьма
четко сформулированной системой. Как таковая, она может измениться
только в целом и не может измениться частично. Останется или защищать эту
систему в целом, или отказаться от ее защиты совершенно.
5. Поэтому нормативную систему надо защищать как целое, особенно
потому, что аномическпе процессы разрушают ее как целое.
6. Уголовное право влияет на коллективные отношения (мнения) при
посредстве наказания. Наказание усиливает коллективные отношения (мне-
ния), так как они имеют достаточный уровень интенсивности. Если уровень
интенсивности недостаточно высок, то наказание только понизит (ослабит)
видимость аномии, или даже катализирует аномические процессы.
7. Влияние наказания применимо в основном в отношении населения,
уважающего законы, так как среди этого населения коллективные отноше-
ния (мнения) достаточно интенсивны.
8. Недостаточность солидаризации с господствующей нормативной си-
стемой оказала влияние на социальную теорию и органы, которые проводят
в жизнь уголовное право. Эта тенденция, вместе с концентрацией внимания
ва отдельных (единичных) правонарушителей, выработала, или имеет тен-
денцию выработать, морально нейтральное применение уголовного права.
9. Если мы хотим, чтобы наказание имело позитивное влияние на
нормативную интеграцию, если мы хотим, чтобы наказание поддерживало
(подкрепляло) или усиливало коллективные отношения, то моральное значе-
ние наказания должно быть сохранено.
10. Однако наказание не разрешает проблемы аномии. В системе фор-
мального правосудия наказание может направить его в отличные (другие)
области социальной жизни, или заставить его принять другую форму. В
условиях постепенно повышающейся потребности изменения социального и
ценностного строя, цель наказания должна заключаться в защите основных
ценностей, которые отражают потребности всего общества в целом. Однако
наказание может защищать их только поддерживая нормативную систему в
целом; нельзя допустить развитие аномпи в некоторых областях, не затра-
гивая жизненных (существенных) центров нормативного строя.
11. Поэтому принудительное применение уголовного права будет неиз-
бежно иметь амбивалентное воздействие; оно усилит нормативную интегра-
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цию некоторых норм в некоторых слоях общества, и в то же время оно
оттенит (подчеркнет) аномию других норм в других слоях общества.
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